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THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER 
Adam Rosenzweig* 
Imagine that the United States faces an unprecedented 
Constitutional crisis. Earlier in the year, Congress authorized the 
President to spend $3 trillion, comprised of $1 trillion in defense 
spending to fund a war duly authorized by Congress, another $1 
trillion of interest on debt incurred by the United States also 
duly authorized by Congress, and another $1 trillion of Medicare 
expenses (which are mandatory under existing law duly enacted 
by a previous Congress). As the end of the year approaches, the 
President realizes that the United States will not have enough 
money to pay all these bills, leading to a choice: should the 
President (1) decline to prosecute a duly authorized military 
conflict, (2) fail to pay interest on duly authorized and issued 
national debt, (3) fail to make duly authorized and mandatory 
Medicare payments, or (4) borrow an additional $1 trillion to 
cover the shortfall? The President chooses option (4), and thus 
requests the authority from Congress to issue $1 trillion of debt. 
But this time Congress refuses, denying the President the power 
to issue the debt. What options remain? 
This hypothetical represents a simplified version of the so-called 
“debt ceiling” standoff between Congress and President Obama in 
2011. The resolution at the time was a compromise (of sorts) to raise 
the statutory debt limit in exchange for certain promises to cut 
spending in the future. But what if Congress had stood its ground? 
Either the President could violate the Constitutional obligation to 
faithfully execute the laws by failing to spend duly authorized funds 
or violate the separation of powers by issuing debt without 
Congressional authorization. A real Constitutional crisis seems to 
emerge,1 with no way out. Or is there? 
 * Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis. The author would like to 
thank Neil Buchanan, John Drobak, Bruce LaPierre, Ronald Levin, Greg Magarian, and 
the participants at the 2013 Annual Critical Tax Conference and the UNLV Faculty 
Speaker Series for the extremely valuable and insightful comments on earlier versions of 
this essay. Any errors are solely those of the author. 
 1. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 707 (2009) (referring to this as a Type II Constitutional Crisis). 
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As most American schoolchildren learn in civics class, the 
United States government is comprised of three branches: the 
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. So if the legislative 
and executive cannot—or will not—comply with their 
Constitutional obligations, what about the judiciary? Could a 
federal court itself, under its own authority, satisfy the 
Constitution if the other branches won’t? Typically, when the 
Executive violates the Constitution the solution is for the 
Supreme Court to order the Executive to fulfill its Constitutional 
obligations. But in the hypothetical above this would not be 
sufficient; even if it wanted to, the Supreme Court couldn’t order 
the President to spend money the country didn’t have, nor could 
it order Congress to pass a new statute to authorize debt or 
withdraw appropriations.2 
The thesis of this Essay is that, under certain limited 
circumstances, the Supreme Court can, under its own, 
independent, power under Article III of the Constitution, 
impose taxes and borrow money, wholly separate from the 
powers of Congress to do so under Article I or any potential 
powers of the President to do so under Article II.3 
While at first glance this may seem like an odd, or even 
outrageous, contention, in fact the Supreme Court has 
recognized the inherent power of federal courts to do something 
strikingly similar over twenty years ago in the case of Missouri v. 
Jenkins.4 In that case, the school district of Kansas City, 
Missouri, was ordered to undertake certain spending to comply 
with Brown v. Board of Education (“Brown I”).5 The school 
district passed a new property tax to do so, but the state of 
Missouri passed a law withdrawing the taxing power from the 
school district, making the tax increase null and void. The district 
court found the state’s actions unconstitutional, and ordered the 
school district to collect the tax and spend the money. In other 
words, the court itself ordered the imposition and collection of a 
 2. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 
YALE L.J. 87 (1999). 
 3. This is distinct from the claim that the courts take fiscal matters into account in 
making their decisions. See NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE: 
HOW COURTS FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (2011). 
 4. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). Due to the procedural history of the case, this opinion is 
often referred to as Jenkins II. Jenkins I involved a review of attorney’s fees, Missouri v. 
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), and Jenkins III involved the review of desegregation orders 
across districts, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). For simplicity, this Essay will 
refer to Jenkins II as Jenkins as it only focuses on the question of the judicial taxation 
decree at issue in that case. 
 5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].  
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tax that was not authorized by state law. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court effectively held that this was within the inherent 
power of the district court to remedy Constitutional violations.6 
Jenkins understandably caused quite an uproar at the time, 
although much of the commentary focused on the aspect of the 
case related to the power of federal courts over states and 
localities,7 while others on the more limited issue of enforcement 
of school desegregation.8 But on the face of the opinion, neither 
is necessarily correct. Rather, in Jenkins the Supreme Court 
held that when a law-making body authorizes spending, then 
refuses to allocate the resources to meet this spending, and, 
crucially, the failure to do so violates the Constitution, the 
courts have the independent power to raise the money directly 
to remedy the Constitutional violation, irrespective of 
legislative authority to do so.9 
This fact pattern seems almost identical to the hypothetical 
at the beginning of this Essay. Congress authorizes spending by 
statute, the President—Constitutionally obligated to execute 
that law—tries to undertake the spending, but then Congress 
effectively withdraws the ability from the President to do so. If 
failure to spend the money would violate the Constitution,10 
Jenkins would seem to stand for the proposition that the Court 
could order the President to raise and spend the money. Taken 
to an even further extreme, the Court could itself raise the 
money and provide it to the President to spend, either through 
taxing or borrowing, to avoid the Constitutional violation. 
Not only would recognition of such a power fundamentally 
alter any future debates over taxing and spending, it could 
potentially offer a way out of the policy and political stalemate 
facing the country. After all, if both Congress and the President 
 6. As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court held that the district 
court should have given the school district an opportunity to enact its own tax before 
doing so itself under principles of comity. See generally D. Bruce LaPierre, Enforcement 
of Judgments Against State and Local Governments: Judicial Control Over the Power to 
Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299 (1992). 
 7. Id. note 6. 
 8. See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: 
Abandoning the Unfinished Business of Public School Desegregation “With All Deliberate 
Speed”, 39 HOW. L.J. 693 (1996); The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, 
Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071 (2004). 
 9. This is in contrast to the ruling in Jenkins III, which held that specifying the type 
and location of schools across districts was inappropriate. 515 U.S. at 133. 
 10. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); see generally Gerard 
N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 1243 (2012).  
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knew that doing nothing would lead to five justices of the 
Supreme Court choosing how to fund the government, the odds 
of a stalemate would be reduced dramatically. Perhaps the 
recognition of the existence of such a power could itself force the 
government out of its rut and return a real balance of power to 
the coordinate branches of government. 
To this end, Part I of this Essay will summarize and describe 
the facts and holding of Missouri v. Jenkins, demonstrating the 
already recognized Article III power to tax. Part II will then 
describe why and how the logic and reasoning of Jenkins can and 
should apply with equal, if not stronger, force to the federal 
government as opposed to state legislatures. 
I. MISSOURI V. JENKINS: RECOGNIZING THE 
JUDICIAL POWER TO TAX 
Prior to the landmark decision of Brown I, the schools of 
the State of Missouri (“Missouri”) were legally segregated by 
race.11 The decision in Brown effectively struck down the de jure 
segregation of schools, but as with many school districts across 
the country this did not mean the end to de facto school 
segregation. In response, the Supreme Court ordered, in Brown 
II,12 that the district courts enforce the mandate of Brown I by 
using their broad equitable powers to undo the vestiges of de 
jure segregation in schools. 
In 1977, certain parents and students sued Missouri and the 
Kansas City Missouri School District (“KCMSD”) for failing to 
comply with the mandates of Brown and undertake the efforts 
necessary to ameliorate the effects of the previous de jure 
segregation.13 Pursuant to Brown II, in 1984 the district court 
agreed and ordered KCMSD to undertake a number of efforts to 
remediate the existing de facto segregation in the district, 
including remedial education programs in underserved schools 
and capital improvements in facilities.14 
The problem faced by KCMSD was that it did not have 
enough money to comply with the district court’s order. Of 
course, this is a problem that is conceptually easy to remedy—
KCMSD could simply raise taxes. The problem with this remedy 
is that Missouri, in the interim, had adopted rules effectively 
 11. See LaPierre, supra note 6. 
 12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
 13. See LaPierre, supra note 6. 
 14. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987).  
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prohibiting KCMSD from doing so.15 The intention of this was 
clear. Missouri, having already lost one school desegregation 
case in Saint Louis and clearly sensing that it would lose in 
Kansas City, took away the taxing power from KCMSD so that, 
even if it lost, it would not be able to comply with any district 
court orders requiring new funding.16 
This put the district court in a difficult position. The 
Supreme Court had clearly mandated that the court use its broad 
equitable powers to enforce Brown, and the court had found 
that KCMSD was not in compliance with Brown, but it could not 
order KCMSD to impose new taxes because KCMSD was 
prohibited by state law from doing so. The solution adopted by 
the district court, relying in part on the Saint Louis case, was to 
strike down the state law limiting the KCMSD taxing power as a 
violation of Brown.17 In the Saint Louis case, this alone was 
sufficient because the Saint Louis school district had already 
increased its taxes, which therefore became effective as soon as 
the state law had been found unconstitutional. Thus, striking 
down the state cap effectively raised sufficient taxes to comply 
with the court’s order. The difficulty in the KCMSD situation 
was that the state cap had been put in place before the KCMSD 
tax increase had been approved. Thus, merely striking down the 
cap was not sufficient. 
The district court once again found itself in a bind. This 
time, however, the court had no precedent upon which to draw. 
Instead, the court fashioned its own remedy, taking up the call in 
Brown II to use its equitable powers as necessary. The district 
court ordered KCMSD to adopt a new property tax and, in the 
interim, ordered that a new income and property tax be imposed 
under its own inherent power, and in addition, that $150 million 
of new bonds be issued, all in direct contravention to the 
Missouri Constitution.18 
As has been widely noted, states and localities are 
particularly sensitive to federal courts telling them how to tax 
their own citizens.19 But the order in the KCMSD case went even 
 15. See LaPierre, supra note 6. 
 16. See LaPierre, supra note 6. See also Kevin Little, Missouri v. Jenkins: Exploring 
the Judicial Limits of the Supremacy Clause, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 137 (1991). 
 17. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 403. 
 18. Id. at 412. 
 19. See LaPierre, supra note 6; see also Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the 
State Constitution Something Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1437 (2005).  
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beyond that. Missouri was concerned that if the order in 
KCMSD was upheld, federal courts would be able to impose 
their own taxes directly on the citizens of states without the 
approval, or even the input, of the state governments 
themselves. On this basis, Missouri appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit, claiming that the order in KCMSD exceeded the district 
court’s authority. 
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court order in large 
part.20 The primary issues on which it did not agree with the 
district court were: (1) the Circuit court struck down the income 
tax surcharge adopted by the district court, and (2) the Circuit 
court held that KCMSD should be permitted, as an initial 
matter, to set the rate of property tax to further federal/state 
comity.21 Under the doctrine of federal/state comity, the federal 
government should avoid intruding on matters traditionally 
within the jurisdiction of the states, even if there is a legitimate 
federal interest, to avoid potentially undermining the state 
sovereignty implicit in a federal system.22 Thus, the Eighth 
Circuit found that directly choosing the rate was the line which, 
if crossed, would violate comity by introducing the federal court 
into state and local matters, regardless of if the court had the 
power to do so. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority substantially 
upheld the Eighth Circuit, agreeing that the district court should 
not have ordered the income tax surcharge and also agreeing 
that the district court should not have directly imposed a tax on 
KCMSD.23 Importantly, however, the majority opinion agreed 
with the Eighth Circuit that ordering KCMSD to impose a 
property tax and following procedures permitting the district to 
determine the appropriate rate would be within the power of the 
district court. Thus, the order that KCMSD implement a 
property tax increase and bond issuance was upheld.24 
A concurring opinion, signed by four Justices, disagreed 
with the majority on this last point. In particular, the concurring 
opinion noted that, in effect, there was no difference between a 
court directly ordering a tax increase and a court ordering that a 
locality enact a tax increase.25 Either way, the court was ordering 
 20. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 19. 
 23. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (1990). 
 24. Id. at 51. 
 25. Id. at 62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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a tax under its own inherent authority. The Justices concurred in 
the judgment, however, even though they believed the tax to be 
outside the court’s authority, because they found the tax issue to 
be outside the scope of the case on appeal.26 
Importantly, however, the concurring opinion did agree 
with the majority opinion on one key issue: that the issue in the 
case ultimately came down to a question of federal/state comity. 
In other words, both the majority and the concurrence ruled that 
the district court should not have exercised its existing and broad 
inherent powers in deference to the state sovereignty inherent in 
state and local taxation. Thus, in effect, the Court unanimously 
agreed that federal courts could have the power to impose taxes 
or issue bonds, the only question in the Jenkins case being 
whether doing so had intruded into traditional areas of state and 
local sovereignty.27 
This core holding of Jenkins has been underappreciated for 
over two decades. Rather than being an odd outlier limited to 
the unique facts of the post-Brown school desegregation cases, 
Jenkins represents the clear and unanimous recognition by the 
Supreme Court of a vibrant, robust Article III power to tax and 
spend to remedy Constitutional violations under specific and 
particular circumstances. The next section will consider these 
circumstances in more detail. 
II. THE JUDICIAL FISCAL POWER: EXTENDING 
JENKINS TO THE FEDERAL CO-ORDINATE 
BRANCHES 
Return to the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article. 
Congress has authorized spending but not the means to raise the 
money to undertake this spending. Clearly a fiscal crisis, and 
potentially a Constitutional crisis, has arisen. But what does 
Jenkins have to do with this? 
In fact, when looked at closely, Jenkins is directly on point. 
This can be seen more clearly by specifically delineating the holding 
in Jenkins and distinguishing it from the dicta. In so doing, a clear 
path to application to the federal co-ordinate branches emerges. 
 26. Id. at 80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 27. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent 
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1134 (1996) (“[Jenkins] 
did not invalidate the order on the grounds that it was inconsistent with Article III, the 
Tenth Amendment, or principles of federalism. Instead, the Court held that the district 
court had gone too far because, rather than impose the tax increase itself, it should have 
ordered the school district to do so instead”).  
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The following represents the logical steps necessary to the 
holding of Jenkins: 
1. A Constitutional violation has occurred; 
2. Federal courts have the power to order a remedy to 
the Constitutional violation; 
3. Another branch effectively undermines the ability of 
the federal courts to implement the remedy; 
4. If so, the courts have the inherent power under 
Article III of the Constitution to impose the remedy 
directly. 
From this perspective, the holding in Jenkins makes perfect 
sense. In fact, every Justice considering Jenkins agreed to these 
logical steps. First, Missouri and KCMSD violated the 
Constitution by legally segregating the schools. Second, the 
Supreme Court recognized in Brown II that the federal courts 
have the power to remedy this violation through affirmative 
actions such as ordering busing and ordering facility upgrades. 
Third, Missouri attempted to undermine this power by revoking 
the ability of KCMSD to raise taxes to pay for these actions. 
Fourth, the federal courts have the inherent power to strike 
down the undermining law as unconstitutional and order that the 
taxes be adopted to implement the remedy. 
There is no reason this cannot be extrapolated to more 
current debates.28 With respect to the Constitutional questions, 
the bulk of the literature considering the debt ceiling showdowns 
has already focused on precisely these issues, and thus this 
section can serve mostly as a review of that literature as a 
predicate to engaging in the broader judicial taxation point. 
First, a Constitutional violation has occurred. In this case, it is 
one of the following: (1) Congress prevented the President from 
faithfully executing the law under Article II, (2) Congress 
questioned the validity of the public debt under Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the federal courts have the power to remedy such 
Constitutional violations. Third, any remedy to be adopted by 
the federal courts would require either taxing or spending, each 
of which Congress has prohibited. Fourth, the federal courts 
 28. See James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The 
Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by 
Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012).  
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must have the inherent power to force Congress to adopt some 
fiscal provision to prevent the Constitutional violation. 
The remainder of this Section will discuss each of these 
logical steps in order. 
A.THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
1. Article II 
Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution provides that the 
President of the United States “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”29 This has been interpreted to mean that the 
President is obligated to enforce the laws adopted by Congress.30 
But what happens when the President cannot comply with all of 
the laws enacted by Congress at the same time? In such a 
situation, the President simply cannot comply with the 
Constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law without 
violating another provision of the Constitution, specifically that 
only Congress has the power to impose taxes or authorize 
spending.31 
More specifically, the President faces three duly enacted 
and valid federal laws: (1) mandated spending such as interest 
due on public debt, entitlement programs like Social Security 
and Medicare, and discretionary spending such as military and 
Health and Human Services, (2) insufficient revenue raised from 
duly enacted taxes, and (3) a prohibition on issuing new debt. 
Thus, the President has only three choices: (1) fail to undertake 
duly authorized spending, (2) raise revenue not authorized by 
Congress, or (3) issue new debt in excess of the limit on public 
debt. All three are unconstitutional.32 
Thus, Congress has duly enacted valid laws that, when taken 
together, force the President to violate the Constitutional 
obligation of faithfully executing the laws. 
This can be seen even more starkly through a simpler 
example. Assume Congress in 2004 authorized the federal 
government to pay for insulin for all American citizens with 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
 30. See Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully 
Executed, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (2012). 
 31. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least 
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) From the Debt Ceiling 
Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (2012). 
 32. See id. at 1196–97 (referring to this as the “trilemma”).  
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diabetes. They expect this will cost $100 million per year each 
year and thus Congress appropriates $100 million to pay for 
insulin under this program. At the same time, Congress forbids 
any tax revenue from being used to pay for the insulin. Now the 
President must either fail to comply with the spending mandate 
or violate the funding restriction. Or, if one prefers, in 2004 
Congress authorizes the President to fight a war with Iraq and 
adopts a sufficient appropriation to pay for the war, but then 
adopts a law mandating that the war not add to the federal debt. 
The idea is the same. 
Some may contend this is, in fact, not a Constitutional 
violation. Rather, all that is required from the President is that 
the law be faithfully executed, not perfectly executed. Thus, the 
President could pay the bills as they come in and then stop 
paying the bills once the money runs out. Since this would be 
within the discretion of the Executive in how to manage the 
budget of the federal government, there would be no 
Constitutional violation.33 
This argument requires assuming that spending mandated 
by federal law is only permitted but not required and that the 
President could have the unilateral authority not to spend 
money authorized by Congress. Unfortunately, the little law 
there is on this subject contradicts this argument. First, the 
Supreme Court has held that the President does not have, and 
cannot have even with Congressional approval, the right to veto 
individual items of spending in a larger spending bill.34 
Permitting the President to pick and choose among approved 
items of spending effectively would grant the President a line-
item veto, thus making it unconstitutional. So this does not solve 
the Constitutional problem. 
Second, Congress itself could order the President to 
prioritize certain spending over others without a statute.35 For 
example, the President could ask Congress which spending 
should be prioritized rather than make this decision unilaterally. 
 33. See, e.g., Kelleigh Irwin Fagan, Note, The Best Choice Out of Poor Options: 
What the Government Should Do (Or Not Do) if Congress Fails to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 
46 IND. L. REV. 205, 233–238 (2013). 
 34. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The dissent in Clinton 
noted that it might be possible for Congress to enact discretionary expenditures without 
running afoul of this doctrine. See id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if this was the 
law, which is not clear, it would not apply to mandatory spending such as Medicare or 
interest on national debt. 
 35. See Full Faith and Credit Act, H.R. 807, 113th Cong. (2013), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr807rh/pdf/BILLS-113hr807rh.pdf.  
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Unfortunately this does not solve the problem either. The 
Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot direct the 
President through resolution as to how to execute the law, even 
if it does so pursuant to duly enacted legislation permitting it.36 If 
the President and Congress agreed which spending should be 
prioritized over other spending, they could jointly pass a new 
statute changing the prior spending, even retroactively. In such a 
situation, however, there would not be a problem in the first 
place. The problem only arises when Congress and the President 
disagree. In fact, in the context of the debt ceiling, it is precisely 
because Congress and the President cannot agree that the 
conflict arose in the first place. 
Taken together, this means that neither the President alone 
nor Congress alone can resolve the Constitutional “trilemma” 
(i.e., three unconstitutional choices) facing the President.37 Thus, 
a violation of Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution. 
2. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
“[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law . . . shall not be questioned.” Thus, some have argued that 
the debt ceiling showdown itself violated Section 4.38 
The argument goes something along the following: (1) 
Congress duly authorized public debt and other spending; (2) 
once public debt is so authorized Congress cannot do anything 
that threatens the debt being paid; (3) Congress has not 
authorized enough revenue to pay the interest on the debt and 
all the other authorized spending and has prohibited the 
President form borrowing to do so; (4) taken together, Congress 
has questioned the validity of the debt by making default 
possible. 
This is not as radical an idea as it first may seem. In fact, the 
Supreme Court has held that 
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, in its fourth section, explicitly 
declares: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned,” [This is] 
confirmatory of a fundamental principle which applies as well 
to the government bonds [issued after], as to those issued 
 36. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 37. See Buchanan & Dorf supra note 31. 
 38. See Jacob D. Charles, Note, The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the 
Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstructionism, 62 DUKE L.J. 1227 (2013).  
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before the amendment was adopted [and] the expression 
“validity of the public debt” embrace[s] whatever concerns 
the integrity of the public obligations.39 
Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court held that ordering 
non-payment or payment not pursuant to the terms of the debt 
was outside of the power of Congress. Thus, it seems clear that 
Congress cannot directly enact a statute calling for the default or 
disavowal of the public debt of the United States.40 
The question then becomes whether Congress may 
indirectly do what it cannot do directly. In this case, Congress 
clearly authorized public debt but did not authorize the means 
for the President to satisfy the public debt. Commentators have 
claimed that this itself in fact would violate Section 4 and thus is 
unconstitutional.41 
Others have countered that failure to authorize sufficient 
funds to engage both in statutory spending and servicing valid 
public debt is not problematic because the President can simply 
prioritize the public debt over other spending and avoid violating 
Section 4. The argument on its face is appealing; Section 4 
mandates servicing the public debt, the President has plenty of 
money to do so, and if the President runs out of money afterwards 
that does not violate any specific Constitutional provision.42 
There are two problems with such an argument, however. 
First, it runs into the same Article II problem as discussed above. 
If the President chooses to service the public debt at the expense 
of paying military contractors (for example), the President has 
still failed to execute the laws of the land. Even if this could be 
overcome, for example by claiming that choosing the least 
unconstitutional option still complies with Article II,43 such an 
approach faces another potential issue: the impoundment problem. 
In 1972, President Nixon invoked the inherent power of the 
Presidency to impound, or refuse to spend, funds authorized by 
Congress on certain environmental programs. Earlier that year, 
President Nixon had vetoed the legislation authorizing such 
funds but Congress overrode the veto. The issue made its way to 
the Supreme Court, which held in Train v. City of New York44 
 39. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935). 
 40. See also Fagan, supra note 33. 
 41. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31. 
 42. See Fagan, supra note 33. 
 43. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31. 
 44. 420 U.S. 35, 44–46 (1975).  
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that the President could not use impoundment to avoid the 
Constitutional override of his veto with respect to the authorized 
funds. In other words, the President cannot do indirectly what 
the President cannot do directly. 
It is possible that Train is limited to the situation where 
Congress overrode the veto of a President, and that absent such 
an override the President retains the inherent power to impound 
authorized funds. For example, President Jefferson claimed such 
a power over two hundred years ago.45 Alternatively it is possible 
that Train is limited to the situation where the President has the 
legally authorized funds available and simply chooses not to 
spend them. Either way, there is no doubt that the Supreme 
Court believes that the issue is one subject to judicial review, and 
any attempt by the President to impound funds necessary to 
satisfy Section 4 would itself simply end up in court.46 
Further, in 1974 Congress enacted the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which forbade 
Presidents from impounding funds absent approval by Congress 
within 45 days.47 Presumably this would itself prevent the 
President from unilaterally choosing to service the public debt 
and default on other authorized spending without approval from 
Congress.48 But, of course, if Congress could agree to this the 
President would not be in the position in the first place. So it 
would seem the Impoundment Act would present another 
insurmountable hurdle to using impoundment to resolve the 
Section 4 problem. 
Taken together, it appears Section 4 presents an alternative 
Constitutional violation sufficient to satisfy the first prong of 
Jenkins. 
B. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE POWER TO RESOLVE 
The second step of Jenkins requires inquiring into whether 
the federal courts even have the power to resolve the 
Constitutional violation at hand. The Court has made clear that 
 45. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s 
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 30–33 (2001) 
(“President Jefferson seems to have been the first President to have actually impounded 
funds in a manner inconsistent with the will of Congress. In 1801, in his first message to 
Congress, Jefferson announced that he was refusing to spend the money Congress had 
appropriated for the construction of several navy yards”). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602–692). 
 48. See also Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.  
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the inability of a governmental entity to afford to pay for a 
remedy is not a defense to the actual underlying Constitutional 
violation.49 Thus, the issue of whether the courts are able to 
provide a remedy cannot be limited to the question of whether 
Congress has sufficient resources to pay for any such ordered 
remedy. Rather, there are three steps necessary to such an 
analysis: (1) does any plaintiff have standing to bring the claim, 
(2) does the court have an available remedy within its powers, 
and (3) is the issue justiciable (or conversely, is the issue subject 
to the Political Question doctrine). As discussed in more detail 
below, the answer to all three is yes. 
1. Standing 
The standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff with a real 
and identifiable harm bring a case before the federal courts. 
Standing is jurisdictional; absent standing the federal courts do 
not have the power to hear a case. The standing doctrine is tied 
to the Case or Controversy requirement of Article III, which 
prevents federal courts from issuing advisory opinions. 
At first glance, standing seems problematic for a Jenkins 
type claim. Unlike in Jenkins where there were clearly students 
being harmed (the students entitled to the additional spending 
under the court order who were not receiving it), the issue is not 
so clear in other cases.50 The Supreme Court has clearly held that 
a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge a particular fiscal 
policy of the United States simply in their capacity as a 
taxpayer.51 Further, the Supreme Court has recently held that 
even plaintiffs suffering specific harms do not have standing 
under the Establishment Clause to challenge the failure to tax.52 
Thus, it also seems at first glance as if no taxpayer would have a 
specific claim sufficient to establish standing under these 
circumstances.53 
 49. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). 
 50. In actuality, KCMSD brought the initial lawsuit in Jenkins but eventually the 
courts restructured the suit so that it was between students and parents, as the plaintiffs, 
and KCMSD and Missouri, as the defendants. 
 51. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 52. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn (ACS), 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). See 
generally Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced 
Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (2013). 
 53. See Petrella v. Brownback, 2011 WL 884455 (D. Kan 2011) (holding that 
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge a state cap on local jurisdiction taxing power 
solely to require the locality to hold an election on the tax question).  
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The standing problem turns out not to be as troubling as it 
may initially appear, however. This harkens once again to the so-
called Gold Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court.54 As 
noted above, in the Gold Clause cases Congress changed the 
type of currency with which the President could satisfy the public 
debts from gold-backed notes to non-gold-backed notes.55 The 
Supreme Court held that this violated Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but that the remedy sought (payment 
in gold-backed notes) was not available to the plaintiff. 
Crucially, although not discussed, the Supreme Court must have 
determined that the plaintiff in that case—a bondholder—had 
standing to bring the challenge to the potential non-payment in 
violation of Section 4. This must be the case, precisely because 
standing is jurisdictional—the Supreme Court could not hear the 
case at all if the plaintiff did not have standing. 
But standing doctrine has developed considerably since the 
Gold Clause cases. How does this affect the finding that the 
plaintiffs in those cases must have had standing sufficient to 
bring the claims in the first place? It turns out, most likely not at 
all. Recent standing doctrine has focused on the presence of an 
actual harm and whether a particular plaintiff has suffered that 
particular harm. This was most starkly demonstrated in the 
recent case of Hollingsworth v. Perry.56 In that case, opponents 
of California’s Proposition 8, which defined marriage as only 
between a man and a woman under the California Constitution, 
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the proposition 
in federal court. They did so by suing the governor and attorney 
general of the State of California. The district court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs and found Proposition 8 unconstitutional. 
The governor and attorney general declined to appeal the ruling. 
Instead, a third party group supporting the proposition brought 
the appeal. The Ninth Circuit heard the case, finding that the 
appellants had standing after certifying the question to the 
California Supreme Court, and upheld the decision of the district 
court.57 But on certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the third 
party group did not have proper standing to bring the appeal on 
behalf of the state when the governor and attorney general 
declined to do so. 
 54. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 358 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 
U.S. 317, 329–30 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935). 
 55. See Magliocca, supra note 10. 
 56. 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 57. Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1070–71 (2012).  
 
1 - THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER_ROSENZWEIG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2014 11:07 AM 
142 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:127 
The Court in Hollingsworth held that being intensely 
interested in an issue is not the same as bearing an injury in fact 
sufficient for judicial redress.58 The Court made clear that the 
reason for this standing doctrine was not to ensure that 
sufficient damages could be awarded or that adverse parties 
would bring out all the facts, but rather to ensure that courts 
act as judges and not as legislators.59 In doing so, it reiterated 
that the standing doctrine looks to the harm of the particular 
party before the court and the ability of the court to redress the 
harm, to wit: 
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of 
federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” 
§2. One essential aspect of this requirement is that any 
person invoking the power of a federal court must 
demonstrate standing to do so. This requires the litigant to 
prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized 
injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and 
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 
(1992). In other words, for a federal court to have authority 
under the Constitution to settle a dispute, the party before 
it must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm. 
“The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and 
acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. 
III’s requirements.” [Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 
(1986)].60 
Under this standard, bondholders would face the risk of 
nonpayment by the government on government issued bonds, 
and a judgment ordering payment would fully redress this 
injury. So it seems clear that bondholders would have 
standing to bring a claim that a statute violates Section 4 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.61 Contrast this with interest 
groups wanting to issue more public debt to fund authorized 
unemployment insurance benefits. In that case, while the 
 58. “For there to be such a case or controversy, it is not enough that the party 
invoking the power of the court have a keen interest in the issue. That party must also 
have ‘standing,’ which requires, among other things, that it have suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury.” 133 S. Ct at 2659. 
 59. Id. (“This is an essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as judges, 
and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.”) (emphasis 
not included). 
 60. Id. at 2661. 
 61. See John McGuire, Comment, The Public Debt Clause and the Social Security 
Trust Funds: Enforcement Mechanism or Historical Peculiarity?, 7 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
203 (2006). See also Fagan, supra note 33.  
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interest group would clearly be interested, under the 
reasoning of Hollingsworth (which invokes the reasoning of a 
long line of standing precedent62), the interest group would not 
have standing for purposes of Article III. 
But that bondholders may have standing does not alone 
necessarily mean that bondholders would bring suit. Rather, it 
would seem investors who hold U.S. Treasury bonds as an 
investment could simply sell the bonds if they were concerned 
about repayment. This would lead to a drop in price, but more 
importantly the new purchasers would have priced this risk into 
the bond and thus presumably would have little incentive to 
bring a lawsuit either. 
But that too is also not the end of the story, since the largest 
holder of Treasury debt is not the public or foreign governments, 
but rather the Social Security Trust Fund. The problem is that 
the bulk of the debt held by the Social Security Trust Fund is not 
in fact federal Treasury bonds but rather a special type of debt 
only available to the Fund that is privileged over public debt. 
With respect to this special debt, the Fund has a right to be paid 
by statute, but the statute explicitly permits this obligation to be 
abrogated by statute as well. Thus, even if the Trust Fund 
wanted to sue for payment, doing so would not implicate the 
same types of Constitutional claims that a lawsuit brought by 
ordinary public debt holders would.63 This is not the end of the 
analysis, however. In addition to the special Trust Fund debt 
certificates, the Fund also owns regular public debt, payment on 
which could potentially be threatened by a debt ceiling 
standoff.64 There is no reason to believe that solely because the 
Fund holds both types of debt that its injury in fact and redress 
of the federal courts would be any less with respect to its 
ordinary Treasury debt than any other holder of Treasury debt. 
Thus, taken together, presumably the Trustees of the Fund 
could bring a Gold Clause type of claim as plaintiff on the basis that 
failure to pay the bonds would violate their duty to maintain the 
 62. Hollingsworth cites, among others, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560–561 (1992); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
754 (1984); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
 63. See McGuire, supra note 61. 
 64. See Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, et al., Judicial Compulsion and the Public Fisc – A 
Historical Overview, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2012) (distinguishing standing 
claims between those with only general claims on government benefits and government 
bondholders during periods of austerity).  
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solvency of the Fund.65 Under the modern standing doctrine, as 
reflected in Hollingsworth, this would resolve the standing issue.66 
Similarly, since even a potential default could result in an 
immediate and current loss in value to the bonds held by the 
Fund needed to service Social Security obligations, the Fund 
would suffer an actual harm prior to actual default and thus 
under this analysis could well bring a claim before an actual 
default. Further, if the Fund could establish likelihood of success 
on the merits, it would seem that the potential irrevocable loss of 
billions of dollars of value in the Fund’s primary asset (for 
example, if the markets permanently downgraded U.S. debt) 
would be precisely the type of situation in which courts should 
be willing to issue immediate temporary relief pending 
resolution of the trial.67 
2. Remedy 
While the Gold Clause cases and the more recent line of 
cases provide an avenue for standing, at least for the Social 
Security Trust Fund, they present another obstacle: that of 
remedy. The Court held in the Gold Clause cases that the 
plaintiff had standing and that Congress had violated Section 4 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Court had no 
remedy to provide to the plaintiff. This was because the Court 
could not order Congress to print gold-backed dollars to pay off 
the bond, and no other remedy would make the plaintiff whole. 
At first glance this seems prohibitive to finding a remedy in a 
Jenkins-type case between Congress and the President. Looked at 
 65. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Balanced Budget Amendment and Social 
Security: An Alternative Means of Judicial Enforcement, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 513, 
523–24 (1998) (analyzing standing of Social Security Fund trustees to enforce a 
hypothetical Balanced Budget Amendment). 
 66. There should also be no sovereign immunity concern under the Gold Clause 
cases and other precedent, as well as statutory considerations, as well. See Fagan supra 
note 33; McGuire, supra note 61; Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, 
Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 606–08 (1998). 
 67.  See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure 
Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 286 (1992) (“[i]f . . . the most 
compelling reason in favor of entering a preliminary injunction is the need to prevent the 
judicial process from being rendered futile by defendant’s action or refusal to act . . . then 
the case in favor of preliminary injunctions to enjoin the dissipation of assets is 
compelling indeed.”) (internal citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 
1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the Supreme Court’s restriction on issuing preliminary 
injunctions in debt cases does not apply to suits seeking equitable relief); Bethany M. 
Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011).  
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more closely, however, the differences become apparent. In the 
Gold Clause cases the Court held that it could not order Congress 
to issue a specific type of currency and only that specific type of 
currency would suffice to redress the harm at issue. By contrast, in 
most cases the issue will not be what type of currency but how 
much currency is necessary to satisfy the Constitution. Thus, in 
situations where the question comes down to how much money is 
at issue rather than the type of money at issue the conclusion on 
remedy of the Gold Clause cases proves inapt. 
This distinction can be seen in the history of the Jenkins case 
itself. In Jenkins the district court ordered that a property tax and 
an income tax be imposed to fund the necessary capital 
improvements.68 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the order with 
respect to the property tax but reversed on the income tax on the 
theory that district courts cannot impose a tax unless there is no 
other alternative.69 This theory is based on the case of Lidell v. 
Missouri,70 an Eighth Circuit case which explicitly recognized the 
power of district courts to impose taxes directly when there are no 
less intrusive means of remedying the Constitutional violation. 
What to make of Lidell as applied in Jenkins? A brief 
review of the background leading up to Jenkins may prove 
helpful. First, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. County 
School Board71 that district courts have the power to enjoin the 
payment of scholarships and grants if the effect was to violate 
Brown, a traditional negative remedy. Next, the Supreme 
Court held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education (Swann II)72 that district courts had the power to 
order specific actions to remedy a Constitutional violation if 
the defendant refused to do so. This was the introduction of the 
affirmative remedy. Following that, the Supreme Court held in 
Milliken v. Bradley73 that any remedies adopted by the district 
court needed to be narrowly tailored to remedy the underlying 
Constitutional violation and were limited by the constraints of 
comity (in the case of state and local school districts). 
Separately, in cases not related to school desegregation, the 
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in what level of fiscal 
authority a federal court may have to remedy a Constitutional 
 68. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987). 
 69. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 70. 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 71. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 72. 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
 73. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).  
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violation. Thus, the Supreme Court has held in a string of cases 
that when a locality issues bonds a State may not subsequently 
pass a law prohibiting the locality from imposing taxes to repay 
the bond.74 These cases stood primarily for the proposition that 
States could not undermine the validity of a debt issued by a 
locality by removing the locality’s taxing power under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Crucially, however, the 
Supreme Court assumed that the locality had the appropriate 
power to tax at the time the bonds were issued. Thus, the 
negative remedy of striking down the prohibition was sufficient 
to satisfy the debts. In a separate line of cases, however, the 
Supreme Court held that federal courts could not affirmatively 
grant the power to tax to localities for which the State had never 
granted that power in the first place.75 
So Jenkins arose within the context of these disparate lines 
of cases. District courts clearly had the power to forbid 
discriminatory spending but did not have the power to order 
taxes by localities for which they never had the authority. The 
Court in Jenkins applied this line, holding that the district court 
had properly ordered the imposition of a property tax to fund 
the desegregation order—a power KCMSD had prior to its 
being revoked by Missouri—but inappropriately ordered the 
imposition of an income tax—a power that it was unclear 
whether KCMSD had and clearly had not been exercised by 
KCMSD in the past. 
Where does this leave the Court with regard to a remedy for 
a Constitutional violation undertaken by the coordinate federal 
branches? At a minimum, it is clear that the federal courts would 
have the power to strike down the debt ceiling statute if the 
statute itself violated the Constitution. Striking down the debt 
ceiling is different than authorizing new debt, however, which 
authorization would be required to permit the President to issue 
new debt to satisfy statutory spending obligations. In fact, 
technically the debt ceiling is an authorization to issue federal 
debt, up to a certain level, and not really a ceiling at all.76 
This leaves the federal courts looking to more affirmative 
remedies. For example, it is clear that the courts could order the 
 74. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909) 
(striking down statute preventing repayment of bonds); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 
(1906) (striking down statute revoking locality’s charter to prevent repayment of bonds). 
 75. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880); United States v. County of 
Macon, 99 U.S. 582 (1878). 
 76. But see Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.  
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President to undertake spending to avoid a Constitutional 
violation. Per Jenkins, therefore, it would seem that the courts 
should equally have the power to order such spending and to 
authorize a means to engage in the spending which would be 
available absent the legislative prohibition against such 
spending. In other words, the Court could order the President to 
issue debt or collect taxes sufficient to engage in the spending 
necessary to avoid the Constitutional violation. Following the 
limitations in Jenkins, presumably this would mean ordering the 
issuance of new federal debt rather than ordering a new tax 
increase since issuing debt is the typical way the President 
undertakes spending not covered by tax revenue. 
Taken together, then, the Court has the power to order the 
President to issue new debt in excess of the debt ceiling to avoid 
a Constitutional violation. But what if the President does not 
want to do so or cannot do so in a timely manner? Would the 
remedies rejected by the Court in Jenkins now become 
available? 
The Court in Jenkins held that the federal courts had the 
power to order the imposition of taxes directly on residents of 
KCMSD but that it should not have done so on the basis of 
comity. Comity is a doctrine that emerges from the federalist 
structure of the Constitution claiming that federal courts must 
respect the sovereignty of the states within the purview of their 
jurisdiction.77 Based on the doctrine of comity, the Supreme 
Court held that directly imposing taxes would violate the 
sovereignty of Missouri and was thus inappropriate.78 Since there 
was a remedy available that did not violate comity, this lesser 
remedy was upheld by the Court.79 
But a comity doctrine meant to respect the sovereignty of 
the states does not, and cannot, apply to the federal government. 
So how should the ruling in Jenkins be interpreted in light of 
this? One possible reading would be that the Court held that 
direct taxing power is outside of the scope of the power of the 
federal courts under Article III. While this may have intuitive 
appeal, the logic of Jenkins does not seem to support it. Article 
III is jurisdictional. If something is outside the scope of Article 
 77. See, e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the 
Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1994). 
 78. See Jenkins, supra note 4. 
 79. But see Douglas J. Brocker, Note, Taxation Without Representation: The 
Judicial Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins, 69 N.C. L. REV. 741 
(1990).  
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III, the courts cannot engage in that activity regardless of any 
other limitations on the power of the courts. 
In other words, the Supreme Court would not have needed 
to resort to comity—a non-jurisdictional rule—unless the courts 
theoretically had jurisdiction over the case, and thus implicitly 
the power to impose taxes directly under Article III in the first 
place.80 Consequently, rather than reading Jenkins as a 
narrowing of the inherent power of the federal courts, Jenkins 
recognized a vast and significant increase in the power of the 
courts, albeit subject to other limiting doctrines such as comity. 
Taking this as true, could any other doctrine apply to limit 
the ability of the federal courts to impose taxes or issue federal 
debt directly? The most obvious one on its face is the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Under the doctrine of separation of 
powers, a power delegated to one branch of the federal 
government cannot be exercised by another branch of the 
federal government. The policy behind this is to prevent any one 
branch from obtaining the ability to act unilaterally so as to 
minimize the potential abuse of power in the government. 
For example, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has 
held that the so-called Line-Item Veto was unconstitutional 
under the separation of powers doctrine.81 In that case, Congress 
had passed a law granting the power to the President to strike 
down specific items of spending in an appropriation bill while 
signing the larger bill itself. This would permit Congress to pass 
large appropriations bills with so-called “pork barrel” or “log 
rolling” items to garner the votes necessary to pass, but the 
President could sign the bill into law while doing away with these 
wasteful expenditures.82 The Court held that such a system 
violated the separation of powers in that it granted the 
President a quasi-legislative power reserved for Congress under 
the Constitution.83 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants the power 
to impose Taxes, Imposts, Duties and Tariffs to Congress. 
 80. See, e.g,, Peter D. Enrich, Federal Courts and State Taxes: Some Jurisdictional 
Issues, with Special Attention to the Tax Injunction Act, 65 TAX LAW. 731 (2012). 
 81. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 82. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: 
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 
345 (2003). 
 83. For support, the Court also noted that the Act could violate the Presentment 
Clause, which requires the President to sign or veto any bill presented to the President by 
Congress. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421.  
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This would seem to make clear that only Congress may 
impose any such taxes, meaning that under the doctrine of 
separation of powers no other branch could do so. But, as 
usual, the issue is more complicated than it would appear at 
first glance. 
At a minimum, it seems clear that a majority of the Court 
has never held that the federal courts are forbidden from 
engaging in remedies of Constitutional violations solely because 
the remedy would involve entering an area traditionally reserved 
for another branch.84 In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized 
a number of situations in which the federal courts can exercise 
powers that look surprisingly similar to legislative or executive 
powers, notwithstanding that those are clearly delegated to other 
branches.85 For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
power of the federal courts to impose their own Congressional 
districts86 and to decide how to manage and operate prisons, 
including which to close, what staff to hire, and how to fund 
them.87 This point was made explicit by the Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Plata, which stated “Courts nevertheless must not 
shrink from their obligation to enforce the constitutional rights 
of all persons . . . Courts may not allow constitutional violations 
to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion 
into the realm of prison administration.”88 In a different context, 
the Supreme Court has actually said that the federal courts 
taking on the “essentially legislative task”89 of crafting a remedy 
to a Constitutional violation is crucial to the bedrock of the 
separation of powers doctrine.90 
Taken together, according to at least one recent article, “[i]t 
may, in fact, be fair to say that the role of the constitutional 
judge as policymaker and potential administrator of public 
institutions has now become a permanent feature of American 
 84. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1953 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Structural injunctions . . . [turn] judges into long-term administrators of complex social 
institutions such as schools, prisons, and police departments. Indeed, they require judges 
to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by executive 
officials. Today’s decision not only affirms the structural injunction but vastly expands its 
use, by holding that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may produce 
constitutional violations.”). 
 85. See Ridgway, supra note 28 at 103–11. 
 86. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003). 
 87. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 88.  Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1928–29. 
 89. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 90. Cf. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (affirming the 
availability of a Bivens claim if no alternative legislative remedy exists).  
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constitutional law.”91 Thus, the question is not whether federal 
courts may encroach on essentially legislative functions, but 
rather whether doing so in a particular case is entrusted to the 
federal courts pursuant to the Article III mandate that the 
judicial power be exercised by the federal courts.92 
So, is remedying the failure to make Constitutionally 
mandated payments within the judicial power? Given the 
history of the Gold Clause cases and the Jenkins cases, 
especially in light of recent exercises of judicial power in cases 
such as Brown v. Plata, it would seem the answer to this 
question is clearly yes. If anything, the concerns expressed in 
most cases about doing so tend to involve respect for the 
sovereignty of the states in their traditional realms,93 which 
does not apply as between Congress and the President. Thus, 
the question comes down to whether the Court should choose 
to exercise that power in the politically fraught situation of a 
Constitutional showdown between Congress and the President 
leading to such a Constitutional violation.94 The next section 
will consider that question. 
3. The Political Question Doctrine 
In general, the Court has held that it should not exercise 
even its proper jurisdiction over an issue that is a question better 
suited to the political process. This has led to the development of 
the so-called “political question” doctrine. The political question 
doctrine has proven both somewhat elusive and remarkably 
resilient. At times, the doctrine has been described as a form of 
extension of the standing doctrine, that is, that the federal courts 
should choose not to exercise jurisdiction when doing so would 
implicate similar concerns as those raised under the standing 
 91. Laurence P. Claus & Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Courts as “Positive 
Legislators” in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 504 (2010). 
 92. See Yoo, supra note 27. 
 93. See Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1946-47 (“Proper respect for the State and for its 
governmental processes require that the three-judge court exercise its jurisdiction to 
accord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans to correct the 
violations in a prompt and effective way consistent with public safety . . . . At the same 
time, both the three-judge court and state officials must bear in mind the need for a 
timely and efficacious remedy for the ongoing violation of prisoners’ constitutional 
rights”). 
 94. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 991 (2008).  
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doctrine.95 At other times, the political question doctrine has 
been described as a separate doctrine, unrelated to standing, 
providing a pragmatic way for the courts to avoid conflicts with 
the political branches over cases that might raise justiciable 
issues but over which the courts should not interfere.96 
Rather than take a position in this debate, this Section will 
apply the classic political question doctrine, as interpreted by 
scholars,97 as a doctrinal matter. To begin, the classic statement 
of the political question doctrine can be found in the case Baker 
v. Carr98 as follows: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly 
according to the settings in which the questions arise may 
describe a political question, although each has one or more 
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the 
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case 
held to involve a political question is found a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.99 
To this end, the court in Baker held that a challenge to state 
voting laws as violating the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not a nonjusticiable political 
question. Crucially, the Court stated expressly, “the mere fact 
that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it 
 95. See Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008) 
(providing a summary and overview of the differing theories behind standing as 
compared to political question doctrine). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See, e.g., Jesse H Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 
DUKE L. J. 1457 (2005); Oona Hathaway, et. al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, 
and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA L. 
REV. 541 (2004). 
 98. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 99. Id. at 217.  
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presents a political question. Such an objection is little more 
than a play upon words.”100 
Similarly, the mere fact that a suit challenging nonpayment 
of a bond implicates a political showdown does not mean that 
the issue is a nonjusticiable political question; in fact, according 
to the command of Baker that should be irrelevant to the 
question.101 Rather, any analysis should focus on the factors 
delineated by the Court in Baker instead. 
To this end, recent scholarship has strenuously argued that 
the treaty power is not a political question under this rubric, 
notwithstanding that the decision to enter into a treaty is a 
deeply political one clearly committed to the political 
branches.102 Hathaway, et al., apply a Baker taxonomy to 
determine whether the treaty power is a political question.103 
This Essay will apply the same taxonomy. 
Pursuant to this taxonomy, the first factor does not apply 
because it rarely applies.104 Per the article, “[t]he fact that these 
powers are entrusted to other branches does not mean that 
oversight of their lawful exercise is outside the responsibility of 
the judiciary.”105 Rather, the issue is whether the power has been 
expressly or impliedly committed to the political branches. 
Given the history of the Gold Clause cases, Jenkins v. Missouri, 
and even more recent cases such as Busse v. City of Golden, it 
would be difficult to contend that such issues are unambiguously 
committed to the political branches. Thus, factor one would not 
preclude review of the issue. 
Under the taxonomy, the second and third factors question 
whether judicial criteria, as opposed to purely political criteria, 
are available to resolve the question at issue.106 This tends to 
come down to the question of whether fixed, clear, and 
articulable standards can be used to determine the outcome of 
the case. Again, given the history of the court in addressing 
issues relating to the issuance of federal bonds and the need for 
inherent remedial powers, there is no reason to doubt that the 
 100. Id. at 209 (internal quotations omitted). 
 101. Cf. Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660, 664 (Colo. 2003) (holding that 
question of whether city spent bond proceeds on inappropriate expenditures is not a 
political question under the Colorado constitution, citing Baker v. Carr). 
 102. See Oona Hathaway et al., supra note 97. 
 103. See id. at 280–85. 
 104. Id. at 280. 
 105. Id. at 281. 
 106. Id. 
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issue of whether the federal government has violated the 
Constitution in failing to authorize sufficient revenue to pay its 
debts is justiciable, especially since the Court has already done 
so in the past. 
For example, a single bondholder may have a single 
payment of a fixed amount due on a fixed date. If the federal 
government cannot pay on the fixed due date and defaults, the 
question of nonpayment clearly seems subject to justiciable 
standards, i.e., whether the government failed to make a fixed 
payment on a fixed due date. As these are clear and specific 
legal and factual questions, if anything these factors would seem 
to weigh strongly in favor of judicial review. 
Per the taxonomy, “[t]he fourth, fifth, and sixth prongs of 
the Baker test all address the prudential consideration that there 
are times when it is imperative for the government to speak with 
one voice.”107 It is under this rubric that the need for judicial 
action in fact becomes most stark. In fact, as opposed to the 
scenario in which which the political branches have spoken with 
a unitary voice, in the circumstances described in this Essay the 
political branches have failed to work at all. To wit: both 
Congress and the President authorized duly issued federal debt 
and annual spending plans, both Congress and the President 
authorized the tax law that generated insufficient funds to meet 
these obligations, and both Congress and the President enacted a 
debt ceiling (and failed to raise it) preventing the President from 
borrowing to meet this shortfall. While this may present a 
Constitutional Crisis,108 it is precisely the opposite situation 
envisioned by Baker in establishing the prudential 
considerations underlying the political question doctrine. 
Taken together, if anything the Baker factors would seem to 
lean in favor of judicial resolution of this issue rather than 
nonjusticiabilty as a political question. This may strike some as 
odd, or perhaps even discomforting. After all, what could be 
more inherently political than a political showdown between the 
two democratically elected branches of government over fiscal 
policy? This is true, to an extent. If the matter was one of first 
impression, i.e., it was a political debate over whether to engage 
in a new spending program, such an argument could well be 
persuasive. But this is not such a case. The political branches 
have painted themselves into a proverbial corner. By issuing 
 107. Id. at 282. 
 108. See Levinson and Balkin, supra note 1.  
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debt and authorizing spending, the political branches implicated 
Constitutional protections they need not have. But once 
implicated, the fact that a political fight leads to the violation of 
these protections does not cloak the Constitutional violation in 
the protection of the political question doctrine. 109 
This ultimately may be the true lesson of Jenkins v. 
Missouri, at least as seen through the lens of Baker v. Carr. In 
Jenkins the Court held that if the KCMSD had never had the 
power to impose taxes the remedy adopted by the district court 
might well have been inappropriate. But once granted, the 
power to raise property taxes cannot be rescinded solely as a 
means to violate Constitutional protections, and federal courts 
must have the inherent remedial authority to address such 
violations. If this was true in Jenkins, it would seem only more 
true in a dispute among the coordinate federal branches. 
C. ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
At this point, undertake a thought experiment. Assume 
the President has been authorized to issue sufficient to debt to 
meet the country’s obligations. The President then attempts to 
issue debt to raise money to pay off debts owed to the Social 
Security Trust Fund. Congress then passes a new statute (say, 
by overriding a veto) forbidding the President from issuing 
debt to satisfy debt obligations to the trust fund (for example, 
as an indirect way to try to force Social Security reform). The 
Supreme Court ultimately hears the case and strikes down the 
statute as unconstitutional. By striking down the statute, the 
debt issued once again proves valid under the President’s initial 
authorization and the President may settle the obligations to 
the trust fund. 
What if, instead, Congress initially adopts a law that both 
mandates payment of the Social Security Trust Fund debt 
obligations and also forbids the issuance of new debt obligations 
at the same time? At this point, striking down the statute is not 
sufficient. The President would still be under the obligation to 
settle the trust fund obligations but would not be authorized to 
issue the debt even if the provision forbidding new debt was 
struck down. This is because, at least under current law, the 
 109. A similar argument was cited by the district court in the challenge against 
California’s Proposition 8, i.e., that granting and then removing a privilege invokes 
different Constitutional considerations than never granting it in the first place. See Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
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President must have affirmative authority to issue U.S. debt in 
order to do so. 
What would be the result in such a case? The answer is a 
roadmap to the political branches to avoid judicial oversight of 
potentially unconstitutional behavior simply by choosing option 
2 instead of option 1. The issue, then, is whether Congress or the 
President can, by choosing one procedural approach over 
another, effectively remove the power of the federal courts to 
hear and resolve Constitutional questions. 
This thought experiment is simply a federal version of what 
occurred in Jenkins. KCMSD had the authority to raise property 
taxes to comply with the district court’s desegregation order, and 
in fact attempted to do so. The State of Missouri acted to 
remove this taxing power from KCMSD, causing KCMSD to be 
in default of the order. Merely striking down the Missouri 
statute as unconstitutional, however, might not be sufficient 
without also enacting a new state law authorizing KCMSD to 
raise taxes or issue new debt. Rather, the district court ordered 
the taxes directly to fund the desegregation order. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the remedial power of the district court but 
found the facts looked more like the first situation than the 
second, and ordered the district court to give KCMSD the 
option to raise taxes before doing so directly. 
Thus, the issue in Jenkins was not whether the district court 
had the power to impose taxes to comply with the desegregation 
order, but rather a factual question, informed by principles of 
comity, as to whether KCMSD had the authority to do so simply 
as a result of the district court striking down the Missouri cap on 
KCMSD’s taxing power. 
In the federal context, however, this is not the case. The so-
called “debt ceiling” is itself a creature of the statute authorizing 
the issuance of federal debt.110 This, in turn, raises the so-called 
severability doctrine. In other words, would striking down the 
debt ceiling also strike down the statute authorizing the issuance 
of federal debt in the first place? 
The severability doctrine recently received an extensive 
review by the Supreme Court in the case of NFIB v. Sebelius.111 
In that case, the Court was considering the Constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act, also known as ObamaCare. One of the 
 110. 31 U.S.C. §§3101–3111 (2011). 
 111. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)  
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key questions at issue was the Constitutionality of the so-called 
individual mandate to purchase health insurance. While there 
was significant disparity over that question, a second question 
proved almost as crucial: if the mandate was unconstitutional, 
would that invalidate the entire statute or just the mandate? 
Four justices found the entire Act Constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause power and thus did not address this issue.112 
One justice found the individual mandate unconstitutional under 
the Commerce Clause but Constitutional under the Taxing 
Power and thus did not address the issue.113 Four justices, 
however, found the mandate unconstitutional and found that it 
was not severable and thus invalidated the entire act.114 While 
not a majority, there were some indications that the lone justice 
might have agreed with the severability analysis of this group, in 
which case it would have garnered a majority. 
Under this analysis of severability, the question is whether a 
provision can be struck down in such a way that the core purpose 
of the entire statute is not undermined. In other words, if the 
unconstitutional portion of a statute is crucial to the working of 
the statute as a whole, the entire statute must fall as 
unconstitutional as well.115 Pursuant to this reasoning, the four 
justice opinion in Sebelius held that the entire Affordable Care 
Act must fall if the individual mandate was unconstitutional. 
Assuming this analysis is correct, there is no doubt that the 
debt ceiling provision is core to the debt authorization statute 
as a whole. The entire point of enacting a limit on the 
authorization to issue debt on behalf of the United States is to 
prevent an executive from having unlimited discretion in 
funding the government with debt as opposed to other sources 
of funding. If true, there is no way to sever the ability to issue 
debt with the limit on the amount of debt that can be issued. 
Thus, if the debt limit is unconstitutional, so must be the debt 
authorization as well.116 
If correct, the Supreme Court finds itself in an impossible 
situation. If it finds the failure to raise taxes or issue debt 
violates the Constitution, it may strike down the debt limit as 
 112. Id. at 2609. 
 113. Id. at 2600. 
 114. Id. at 2668-70. 
 115. Id. at 2668. 
 116. Id. at 2669 (“the Court must determine if Congress would have enacted [the 
provisions] standing alone and without the unconstitutional portion. If Congress would 
not, those provisions, too, must be invalidated”).  
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unconstitutional, but doing so would effectively prevent the 
President from issuing new debt, thereby only exacerbating the 
Constitutional violation. Unlike in Jenkins, there is no lesser 
remedy available to the Court, whether under principles of 
comity or separation of powers, to remedy the Constitutional 
violation. Thus, the Court would have to resort to its inherent 
remedial powers to do so. 
This is not to say that the severability analysis is clear or 
obvious, or even that all reasonable people would necessarily 
agree. For example, Buchanan and Dorf have analyzed the debt 
ceiling statute and concluded that the ceiling, 26 U.S.C. § 3101, 
can be unconstitutional independent of the authorization to 
borrow, 26 U.S.C. § 3102.117 Buchanan and Dorf point to a 
number of factors, including that they are separately codified, 
that they have been amended separately, and that the 
authorization can act independently of the limit.118 
This is true, insofar as it goes. Buchanan and Dorf 
undertake this analysis in an attempt to establish that the 
President has the authority to disregard the debt limit in certain 
circumstances.119 But they concede it is not entirely clear how a 
court would deal with the same question in a case properly 
before it, citing precisely the four justice opinion in Sebelius.120 
Thus, the question is not whether the debt ceiling statute could 
properly be severed from the debt authorization statute but 
whether the Court could, in adopting a remedial measure to 
enforce a Constitutional violation, strike down the debt ceiling in 
such a way that would authorize the President to borrow against 
the will of Congress. 
As Buchanan and Dorf appear to concede, authorizing the 
President to issue debt in contravention of the debt ceiling would 
itself be unconstitutional, albeit in their opinion the least 
unconstitutional option.121 To the extent this is true, this Essay is 
in complete agreement.122 The issue is not whether the choices 
faced by the President are unconstitutional, but whether the 
 117. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt 
Ceiling: When Negotiating Over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the President 
Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 32, 38 
(March 5, 2013). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. (“there may be some doubt about whether the courts will presume that 
sub-parts of a single statute are severable”). 
 121. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31. 
 122. See supra p. 136.  
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Court, in the face of this unconstitutional choice, may (or 
potentially must) use its inherent remedial power to fashion a 
Constitutional remedy when Congress attempts to preclude it 
from doing so. Under the doctrine of Missouri v. Jenkins, the 
answer is yes. 
In many ways, this is reminiscent of other disputes between 
Congress and the Court over the proper jurisdiction of the Court 
in potentially politically sensitive questions. While there is no 
recent case law involving such politically contentious issues in 
the fiscal arena, there have been cases in other areas that might 
help shed light on the issue. Perhaps most famously this occurred 
in the cases of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld123 and Boumediene v. 
Bush124—the Guantanamo Bay cases. In those cases, Congress 
attempted to forbid the federal courts from hearing challenges to 
detention by prisoners in Guantanamo Bay by stripping the 
courts of jurisdiction over such claims. The problem was that 
there were potential Constitutional violations occurring as a 
result (in this case, the suspension of habeas corpus). The issue 
came down to whether Congress could, pursuant to its clear 
Constitutional authority to establish the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, strip the courts of jurisdiction in one politically 
sensitive area. The Court held it could not, finding that at some 
point a federal court must have access to hear such a case to 
enforce the Constitutional protections afforded such prisoners, 
striking down the statute as unconstitutional.125 If not, the 
Court held, Congress could effectively abrogate these 
protections from the Constitution.126 In other words, Congress 
could not attempt to avoid the Constitutional issue simply by 
enacting a law purportedly taking away some of the inherent 
“judicial power” of the Court.127 
While the Guantanamo Bay cases literally dealt with issues 
of life and death and legal considerations as important as the 
 123. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 124. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 125. See Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s 
Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012). 
 126. See Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The 
Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 377 (2009). 
 127. See Glashausser, supra note 125 at 1302 (“As is widely recognized, the drafters 
of the Constitution envisioned an independent judiciary that could operate without fear 
of legislative reprisal. What is often overlooked is that the judiciary necessarily consists 
of not only the judges themselves but also the abstract judicial power—including 
jurisdiction—that they wield. Together, Sections 1 and 2 of Article III declare for the 
Supreme Court a robust jurisprudential and jurisdictional independence.”). 
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writ of habeas corpus, perhaps some lessons could be drawn out 
of these cases to the fiscal arena. At its core, the Court held that 
the political branches could not completely abrogate specific and 
enforceable Constitutional protections solely by limiting the 
jurisdiction of the courts. Similarly, permitting Congress to avoid 
any review to enforce the Constitutional protections afforded 
bondholders of the United States would be an attempt by one 
branch to interfere in the operations of another. 
Just as the Supreme Court held that Congress could not do 
so in the case of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, it follows that 
Congress could not do so in the case of bondholders.128 The only 
way to argue to the contrary would be to somehow contend that 
the Constitutional protections afforded by Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or other similar provisions are entitled 
to less judicial protection than those embodying the right to 
habeas corpus or other criminal procedural rights. It is difficult 
to think of a way to differentiate between the relative costs and 
benefits of explicit Constitutional protections based solely on 
their subject matter without placing the courts in the position of 
picking and choosing which provisions they like and which they 
do not. Since this runs directly contrary to the judicial power, at 
least as described by the Supreme Court, this would be a difficult 
argument to make. Accordingly, under this line of reasoning, the 
third prong of the Jenkins analysis would be satisfied as well. 
D. TAXING AND BORROWING AS AN  
INHERENT REMEDIAL POWER 
Assuming the foregoing is correct, the Jenkins test establishes 
that the Court must utilize its inherent remedial authority to craft 
a remedy to the case before it. To this end, the Court seems faced 
with only two choices: (1) raise money through imposing taxes, or 
(2) raise money through issuing federal debt. The immediate 
question that must be addressed, however, is, why not simply 
order the President to do one of these? 
The answer derives, in part, from the seminal case of 
Marbury v. Madison.129 In Marbury, the Supreme Court held that 
Marbury was entitled to a judicial commission, that failure to 
deliver the commission violated Marbury’s rights, and that a writ 
of mandamus to compel the President to deliver the commission 
was the appropriate remedy. However, the Court declined to 
 128. See id. 
 129. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
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enter an order requiring the President to deliver the commission 
to Marbury on the theory that to do so would violate the 
Constitution. More specifically, the Court held that the statute 
granting jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue the writ itself 
violated the Constitution. 
For first-year law students, the take-away of Marbury is that 
the Supreme Court has the power of judicial review, that is, to 
declare that a statute of Congress violates the Constitution and 
therefore is null and void. A second take-away often cited of 
Marbury is that every legal violation is entitled to a remedy.130 
The first is obviously correct, at least insofar as Marbury in fact 
held a statute unconstitutional. The second has proven more 
difficult to apply in the real world.131 
For purposes of this Essay, therefore, the ultimate take-away 
of Marbury is the proposition that the ultimate job of the federal 
courts is to adjudicate cases properly before them and to craft 
appropriate remedies for those cases.132 In Marbury the case was 
not properly before the Supreme Court. But in this situation, 
having undergone the first three steps of the Jenkins analysis, the 
case is properly before the federal courts. Thus, once having 
decided that the provision at issue violates the Constitution, the 
Jenkins test, consistent with Swann and Milliken, not only permits 
but requires the Court to fashion an appropriate remedy. If not, 
the Article III command that the judicial power be vested in the 
federal courts would prove illusory.133 
In some ways, this bears a remarkable resemblance to other 
areas of law where the courts have invoked their inherent 
powers to mandate spending. For example, courts have the 
inherent power to impose and collect fines from people held in 
 130. Id. at 163. 
 131. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338 (1993) (“Marbury’s 
promise of a remedy for every rights violation is better viewed as a flexible normative 
principle than as an unbending rule of constitutional law. Nevertheless, the Constitution 
in general and the Due Process Clause in particular do sometimes require individually 
effective remediation for constitutional violations.”); see also Derek Ludwin, Note, Can 
Courts Confer Citizenship? Plenary Power and Equal Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376 
(1999) (describing Miller v. Albright in which the Supreme Court held it could not 
provide a remedy for an unconstitutional naturalization statute). 
 132. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay 
on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the 
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (2003). 
 133. Joseph J. Anclien, Broader is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37 (2008).  
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contempt.134 But nothing in Article III of the Constitution, 
which vests the judicial power of the United States in the 
Supreme Court and the other federal courts created by 
Congress, says anything about a contempt power or a power to 
impose and collect fines. Yet it is well accepted that such a 
power must exist or else the courts would not be able to fully 
exercise the judicial power.135 
Similarly, courts have held that they may order spending by 
the government absent Congressional authorization in the 
interests of justice. For example, in the case of Jacksonville Port 
Authority v. Adams136 the plaintiffs sued the FAA for failing to 
distribute appropriated funds to them as required by the 
authorizing statute. The FAA contended that since the 
authorizing statute had not been fully funded and the 
appropriations period had closed the court could not order relief 
for the plaintiff. The D.C. Circuit held that not only could it do 
so but that it must order payment notwithstanding the lack of a 
Congressional appropriation in the interest of justice.137 
Perhaps the most striking example occurs in the case of so-
called Bivens actions. Under a Bivens claim, an individual can 
bring suit against federal officials for a violation of a 
Constitutional provision absent any federal statute establishing a 
private cause of action.138 What was quickly recognized in the 
literature is that providing a private cause of action against the 
federal government for money damages is effectively the same 
as the court itself directly engaging in spending federal resources 
as a remedy to a Constitutional violation.139 This is especially 
true in light of Watson v. City of Memphis,140 which rejected the 
inability of the government to afford to comply as a defense.141 
In other words, if a Constitutional cause of action must have 
a remedy, finding a cause is the same as finding that the courts 
have the remedial power to resolve the cause. In a contempt 
 134.  See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the 
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 768-71 (2001). 
 135.  Id. at 770-71. 
 136.  556 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 137.  Id. at 56-57. 
 138. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Defendants of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Technically a Bivens action creates a right to recover from federal 
officers, although in most cases the federal government indemnifies federal employees 
with respect to such claims.  See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 139. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). 
 140. 373 U.S. 526 (1963). 
 141. See Ridgway, supra note 28 at 97.  
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hearing the courts can offer federal officers to pay fines to the 
court regardless if such amounts have been appropriated by 
Congress. In a Jacksonville Port Authority type case the court 
can order funds specifically not appropriated by Congress. In a 
Bivens action, the court can order the federal government to 
spend money (in the form of damages) irrespective of the 
existence of a federal statute authorizing such spending. These 
examples look remarkably similar to a federal court ordering 
spending, and the necessary revenue raising, not otherwise 
authorized by Congress. 
It may be that granting money damages for the violation 
of a non-monetary Constitutional right is a good idea or a bad 
idea.142 But what if the Constitutional violation itself involves 
a failure to spend money, such as in the debt ceiling case? In 
that case, the only possible remedy can be spending the 
money. Then what relevance does Marbury have? The 
relevance is that the Supreme Court cannot craft a remedy 
that would itself independently violate the Constitution. The 
Court in Marbury held that something as simple as physical 
delivery of a judicial commission was outside of the scope of 
judicial remedy because the authorizing statute itself was 
unconstitutional. 
Similarly, the Court cannot order the President to raise the 
money needed to remedy the violation when the President 
faces a Constitutional trilemma, since such a decision would 
force the President to violate an independent Constitutional 
provision such as the Article II clause that the President 
faithfully execute the laws of the United States.143 Presumably, 
therefore, the Court cannot order the President to issue debt 
that the President is not permitted to issue by statute, nor can it 
order Congress to enact a statute either increasing taxes or 
authorizing additional debt.144 
This returns the analysis to the two options facing the Court 
above: (1) impose taxes, or (2) issue debt.145 As between these 
 142. See Jeffries, supra note 2; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth 
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). 
 143. See Strahilevitz, supra note 65. 
 144. See Jeffries, supra note 2. In some ways, this is conceptually related to the so-
called “anti-commandeering” doctrine. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct 2566 (2012). See 
also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 145. A third option, reducing spending, is not considered because it is presumed that 
the Constitutional violation itself involves some failure to spend in violation of Article II, 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or otherwise. See supra p. 136. In other words,  
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two, does one independently implicate the Constitution? Again, 
the answer is yes. The Constitution requires that all measures 
relating to revenues must originate in the House of 
Representatives.146 While this provision has often been seen 
mostly as a formality, recent scholarship has begun to argue that 
it in fact does, and should, have substantive force.147 If this is 
true, the Court directly raising revenue through the direct 
imposition of taxes under its inherent Article III power could be 
troubling from a Constitutional standpoint. 
What then of option (2)? As Professors Buchanan and Dorf 
argue, of all the options this appears to raise the least number of 
Constitutional concerns.148 Assuming there is a Constitutional 
violation, the federal courts have the power to hear the case, and 
if a coordinate branch attempts to prevent that from occurring, 
the courts are obligated to directly impose a remedy—in this 
case, to directly order the Department of Treasury to issue debt 
obligations in the amount and type determined by the Court to 
be sufficient to remedy the violation. 
This is precisely what the district court did in Jenkins. 
Although most famously the district court ordered the 
imposition and collection of property taxes, it also ordered the 
issuance of bonds. Again, the only infirmity of this remedy held 
by the Supreme Court was that the district court should have 
provided KCMSD an opportunity to do so of its own design 
before directly imposing such remedies under principles of 
comity. As discussed above, comity simply cannot apply in this 
case. Of the two remedies adopted by the district court in 
Jenkins, the one that makes the most sense in this context is for 
the Court to directly issue bonds. 
That does not mean that this inherent Article III remedial 
power is necessarily limited to issuing debt, however. In 
circumstances where the Constitutional violation would require 
directly imposing taxes it is possible to think of a situation in 
which the Court could do so.149 
while Congress might have avoided the Constitutional issue in the first place by reducing 
spending, once the Constitutional violation arises due to lack of spending an order 
reducing spending would not remedy the violation. 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 147. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2005) at 170–71; Rebecca M. Kysar, On the 
Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
 148. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31. 
 149. Cf. Ludwin, supra note 131.  
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For example, assume a situation where the Congress and 
the President enact a hypothetical tax law called the Marriage 
Equality Tax Act. Under the META, married couples who 
receive a “marriage bonus” are obligated to pay a special tax to 
offset this bonus while married couples who receive a “marriage 
penalty” will receive a subsidy to offset the penalty.150 Crucially, 
in addition META requires that the penalties and bonuses be 
revenue-neutral, that is, that no tax revenue be raised or lost 
through these payments. It turns out that this is not possible, 
since whether taxpayers face a marriage penalty or marriage 
bonus depends on, among other factors, whether the married 
couple has a sole primary earner or dual earners. This means 
that in some years there could be significantly greater 
marriage bonuses while in others there could be greater 
marriage penalties. 
The President, facing a situation in which there is no way to 
comply with the bonus, penalty, and revenue-neutrality 
provisions all at the same time, chooses to comply with the 
bonus and revenue-neutrality provisions. This results in some 
couples who face the marriage penalty receiving a check to offset 
the penalty while others do not. Married couples not receiving 
the offset check sue claiming a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts agree, yet 
they cannot order the President to issue offset checks to the 
plaintiffs without ordering the President to violate Article II of 
the Constitution by directly violating the revenue-neutrality 
clause of META.151 Striking down the revenue-neutrality clause 
alone is not an option since, based on the assumptions above, it 
was integral to the entire statute. Under a severability analysis 
the entire statute would have to be struck down if a core part is 
unconstitutional. But there is nothing necessarily 
unconstitutional about the entire statute on its face, so there is 
little justification to strike down the entire statute. Instead, the 
 150. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787 (1997). In reality, Congress adopted marriage-penalty relief 
provisions but permitted the marriage bonus to continue, effectively choosing to reduce 
revenue to move towards marriage neutrality rather than adopt a budget neutrality 
approach. 
 151.  This differs from similar cases where Congress in subsequent years chose not to 
fully fund certain programs found in earlier authorizing statutes. In such cases, the courts 
ordered pro rata division of the shortfall as a way to avoid a conflict between the 
mandates of an earlier authorizing statute and the funding of a subsequent 
appropriations bill. See City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In 
the hypothetical the conflicting mandates are in a single statute and thus the City of Los 
Angeles approach does not apply.  
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Court orders that the marriage bonus tax be increased in an 
amount sufficient to raise the revenue necessary to pay the offset 
checks, mitigating the Constitutional violation without striking 
down the entire statute. 
While this is obviously a vastly over-simplified example, it 
demonstrates just how powerful the remedial power of the Court 
to tax and borrow can be. Whenever a statute, for political 
reasons or otherwise, puts the President in a position where a 
Constitutional violation must arise, the Court would have the 
power to resolve the Constitutional violation on its own accord. 
In situations where an order to Congress or the President to 
resolve the violation would itself violate the Constitution, this 
leads to the conclusion that the Court must directly adopt the 
appropriate remedy to effectuate its Article III power. 
III. CONCLUSION 
What should happen when Congress and the President find 
themselves in a fiscal policy showdown resulting in a 
Constitutional violation? This question has risen to the fore in 
light of the recent showdowns over the so-called “debt ceiling” 
and whether the United States might default on its debt. But the 
question is one that reaches far beyond just the debt ceiling 
debate. Rather, it implicates the broader issue of the proper role 
of the coordinate branches of government to function properly 
within the Constitutional framework. 
To this end, this Essay analyzes the proper role of the 
federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, in 
remedying Constitutional violations arising from fiscal policy 
showdowns between Congress and the President. In such 
circumstances, this Essay demonstrates, the courts can, and 
should, have an independent fiscal power under Article III of 
the Constitution. While this may seem radical at first glance, it is 
merely an extension of the well-established powers of the federal 
courts to remedy Constitutional violations in other settings. 
Looked at from this perspective the Article III fiscal power 
makes sense, both from a doctrinal and theoretical point of view. 
Through a robust, but limited and well-demarcated Article III 
fiscal power, the country can avoid continuing Constitutional 
Crises arising over the use of the fiscal power, whether it be in 
the context of the debt ceiling, the tax laws, or otherwise. Only 
in this manner can the full extent of the Constitution’s fiscal 
power be realized. 
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